Appellate deference in Scottish child protection cases by Norrie, Kenneth
Norrie, Kenneth (2016) Appellate deference in Scottish child protection 
cases. Edinburgh Law Review, 20 (2). pp. 149-177. ISSN 1364-9809 , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/54566/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
Appellate Deference in Scottish Child Protection Cases 
 
Kenneth McK.  Norrie* 
 
* Professor of Law at the University of Strathclyde.  The helpful comments of Professor 





C. THE FOUR STAGE ANALYSIS 
a. Stage One: Challenging Findings in Fact 
b. Stage Two: Challenging Findings of Law 
c. Stage Three: Challenging Evaluative Judgments 
d. Stage Four: Challenging Outcome Decisions 










It is generally accepted that an appeal court is not normally the place for a full 
rehearing of the case argued at first instance.  The limited role of the appeal 
court needs to be particularly remembered in child protection cases, which 
tend of their nature to call for assessments of credibility in matters of high 
disputation, and for close evaluations of statutory tests which, however 
precisely expressed, always demand judgments of the nicest character.  
Though society rightly condemns child neglect and abuse in the highest terms, 
courts asked to make orders for the protection of vulnerable children are in 
reality rarely faced with the choice between good and evil, or with a situation in 
which there can only be one acceptable outcome.  Instead, determining the 
outcome of a child protection case usually calls for an assessment of a range 
of options, each of which may carry serious drawbacks, in an attempt to 
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identify which option is the best ± which all too often means the least worst ± 
for the particular child in the circumstances that actually exist.  In many, if not 
most, cases a different outcome from the one determined at first instance 
might well be as rational, reasonable and defensible as the decision actually 
made.  For these reasons the long-recognised need for appeal courts to afford 
a certain degree of deference to the decisions made by the first instance 
tribunal is especially important in child protection cases. But identifying the 
precise level of deference that is appropriate in any individual case is a matter 
of some difficulty, not least because that level may differ depending upon the 
nature of the judgment being appealed against, and of the level of the court 
hearing the appeal.1 
 
The most authoritative recent discussion of appellate deference in the context 
of child protection cases is to be found in WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQWKH
English case of Re B (A Child).2  The substantive question in that case was 
whether a care order made under s.31(2) of the Children Act 1989 and 
designed to lead to the adoption of a three year old child should stand.  The 
order having been made, the primary dispute before the Supreme Court (and 
the one central to the present discussion) concerned the boundaries beyond 
which it would be wrong for an appellate court to set aside the decision of the 
court of first instance.  The purpose of this article is neither to analyse the facts 
of that English case (as complex as they are tragic) nor to explore the English 
legislation at issue there (very different from the Scottish legislation): a 
comparative analysis must await another day.  Rather, utilising the structures 
suggested by the Supreme Court to the issue, this article aims to explore how 
appellate deference operates in Scotland.  The principles derived from that 
exploration will then be applied to the special FRQWH[WRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ
system in Scotland ± where appeals do not go beyond the Court of Session ± 
in oUGHU WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKDW V\VWHP¶V SHFXOLDULWLHV GHPDQG Dny 
modification of the traditional approach. 
                                                          
1 In both S v Locality Reporter Manager 2014 Fam LR 109 (at [36]  W [43]) and M v Locality Reporter 
Manager [2015] CSIH 56 (at [18]  W [21]) the Inner House was at pains to emphasise the limited role of 
the court hearing appeals in child protection cases, and pointed out that the role of the Court of 
^ĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞƐŚĞƌŝĨĨŚĞĂƌŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂůƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ? 







The Supreme Court adopted an analysis which has long been called in 
(QJODQG WKH ³WKUHVKROG DSSURDFK´ ZKHUHE\ D FRXUW WKDW LV DVNHG WR PDNH D
public law order for the protection of a child must ask itself two questions: first, 
whether the statutory threshoOG IRU VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WKH FKLOG¶V IDPLO\ OLIH
has been crossed and, secondly (but only if the first question is answered 
affirmatively), what order it would be appropriate to make.  Crucially, there is 
no implication that, the threshold having been crossed, an order will always be 
made ± for the making of the order, and its terms, is a matter separate from the 
TXHVWLRQRIWKHFRXUW¶VVWDWXWRU\DXWKRULW\WRPDNHWKHRUGHU3  The terminology 
RI ³WKUHVKROG´ KDV QRW WUDGLWLRQDOO\ EHHQ XVHG LQ 6FRWODQG WR describe the 
statutory requirements in the child protection statutes, though the word is 
beginning to appear,4 and helpfully so.  The threshold analysis tends to clarify 
the judicial process by highlighting the conceptually different types of decision 
that need to be made in the course of a child protection case.  Nor is it any 
departure in substance (as opposed to terminology) from the traditional 
Scottish approach.  Under the now replaced Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, the 
Scottish courts applied to the issue of dispensation with parental consent to 
DGRSWLRQ ZKDW FDPH WR EH FDOOHG ³WKH WZR-VWDJH WHVW´ ± was a ground for 
dispensation made out and, if so, ought dispensation be granted?5  This is 
another way of expressing the threshold analysis.6  Again without using the 
³WKUHVKROG´ WHUPLQRORJ\ WKHYHU\VWUXFWXUHRI WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJV\VWHP LQ
                                                          
3 This is the crucial underlying proposition in Re B (A Child), allowing the court to find that ECHR 
considerations, such as proportionality, do not arise at the threshold stage of the judicial process. As 
>ŽƌĚtŝůƐŽŶƉƵƚŝƚ ?ĂƚƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? “EŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶĨĂŵŝůǇůŝĨĞ ?ŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŚĞŶĂũƵĚŐĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
threshold is crossed.  The interference occurs only if, at the welfare stage, the judge proceeds to make 
ĂĐĂƌĞŽƌƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŝŽŶŽƌĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŽƌĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚŵƵƐƚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽƚĨĂůůĨŽƵůŽĨĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? 
4 See for example S, Petitioner 2014 Fam LR 23 at [69] where the question of whether a ground for 
dispensing with parental consent to adoption was referred to aƐ “ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚŝƐƐƵĞ ? ?ĂŶĚMidlothian 
Council v M 2014 SC 168 at [9] and AM & SO v Brechin [2015] SCGLA 52 at [9] where the grounds of 
ƌĞĨĞƌƌĂůƚŽĂĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐǁĞƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ “ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ? 
5 See Lothian Regional Council v A (1992) SLT 858, per Lord President Hope at 862. 
6 Under the current legislation, the two stages are conflated with the welfare ground for dispensing 
ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƚŚĂƚŝĨƚŚĂƚŐƌŽƵŶĚŝƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? “ƉĂƌĞŶƚĂůĐŽŶƐĞŶƚŵƵƐƚďĞĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞĚǁŝƚŚ ?
the court then has no choice in the matter (unlike thĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŝŶĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŐƌŽƵŶĚĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ? ? P
S, Petitioners 2014 Fam LR 23, per Lady Smith at [30]. 
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Scotland encapsulates the separation of the two questions, by requiring two 
different tribunals to provide the answers.7  The threshold question of whether 
there aUHJURXQGVXSRQZKLFK WKHVWDWH FDQ OHJLWLPDWHO\ LQWHUIHUH LQD FKLOG¶V
upbringing falls exclusively to the sheriff if the grounds upon which a child is 
UHIHUUHGWRDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJDUHFKDOOHQJHGRUQRWXQGHUVWRRGLHLILWLVQRW
accepted that the threshold has been crossed); the outcome question of 
whether, once the threshold is crossed, an order ought to be made, and if so 
RQZKDWWHUPVLVDTXHVWLRQWREHDQVZHUHGDWILUVWLQVWDQFHE\WKHFKLOGUHQ¶V
hearing.  The establishing of grounds never legally requires the hearing to 
make an order and it always retains the right to discharge the referral.8 
 
6R WKH ³WKUHVKROG´DQDO\VLV ILWV WKH6FRWWLVKDV UHDGLO\DV LW GRHV WKH(QJOLVK
approach in child protection cases. The importance of Re B (A Child) is not 
that it legitimated this long-established terminology but that it affirmed the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIUHFRJQLVLQJ³WKHGLIIHUHQWLQWHOOHFWXDOH[HUFLVHZKLFKLVLQSOD\LQ
each of these contexts because that will dictate the proper approach of the 
appellate cRXUW WR D FKDOOHQJH DERXW WKH FRUUHFWQHVV RI D MXGJH¶V GHFLVLRQ´9  
Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasised that the judicial decision-making 
process has considerably more stages than would be implied by the 
WHUPLQRORJ\ RI D ³WZR-VWDJH WHVW´  /RUG 1HXEerger10 broke the threshold 
question itself down into three stages WKHILUVW LQVWDQFHWULEXQDO LVUHTXLUHGL
WRPDNHILQGLQJVRIIDFWLLWRLGHQWLI\WKHSURSHUPHDQLQJRIWKHVWDWXWRU\WHVW
DQGLLL WRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU WKHIDFWVPHHW WKH WHVW 7KHRXWFRPHGHFLVLRQ
GHVFULEHGLQ5H%$&KLOGDV³WKHZHOIDUHGHFLVLRQ´EHFRPHVWKHUHIRUHWKH
IRXUWKTXHVWLRQ IRU WKHFRXUW RU LQ6FRWODQG WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJRQFH WKH
WKUHKROGTXHVWLRQKDVEHHQDQVZHUHGDIILUPDWLYHO\11$QDSSHDOPD\EHWDNHQ
                                                          
7 This was famously described by Lord President Hope in Sloan v B  ? ? ? ?^>d ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞ “ŐĞŶŝƵƐ ?
of the system. 
8 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^Đotland) Act 2011, s.119(3)(b). See S v Locality Reporter Manager 2014 Fam LR 
109 at [7]. 
9 [2013] UKSC 33, per Lord Kerr at [107]. 
10 At [50]. 
11 Both Lord Kerr (at [107]) and Lady Hale (at [199]) describe the process as having three rather than 
four stages, but theǇĚŽŶŽƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐŝŶůĂǁ ?>ŽƌĚEĞƵďĞƌŐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚĂŐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁere not at 
issue in Re B. 
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a. Stage one: challenging findings in fact 
First instance tribunals have long been assumed across the common law world 
to have unique advantages in making findings in fact that cannot be 
reproduced on appeal and which therefore require an appeal court to defer to 
such findings. In Clarke v Edinburgh and District Tramways Co,12 Lord Shaw of 
Dunfermline said this: 
³,QP\RSLQLRQWKHGXW\RIDQDSSHOODWH&RXUW... is for each Judge of it to 
put to himself, as I now do in this case, the question, Am I ± who sit 
here without those advantages, sometimes broad and sometimes 
subtle, which are the privilege of the Judge who heard and tried the 
case ± in a position, not having those privileges, to come to a clear 
conclusion that the Judge who had them was plainly wrong?  If I cannot 
be satisfied in my own mind that the Judge with those privileges was 
plainly wrong, then it appears to me to be my duty to defer to his 
judgmeQW´ 
 
The advantages adverted to in this dictum are specified more explicitly by Lord 
MacMillan in Thomas v Thomas,13 which is now the locus classicus for 
deference to the fact-finder, at least in Scotland: 
³7KH DSSHOODWH &RXUW KDV EHIRUH LW RQO\ WKH SULQWHd record of the 
evidence.  What is lacking is evidence of the demeanour of the 
witnesses, their candour or their partisanship, and all the incidental 
elements so difficult to describe which make up the atmosphere of an 
actual trial.  This assistance the trial Judge possesses in reaching his 
conclusion, but it is not available to the appellate Court.  So far as the 
                                                          
12 1919 SC(HL) 35 at p. 37. 
13 1947 SC(HL) 45 at p.59. 
6 
 
case stands on paper it not infrequently happens that a decision either 
way may seem equally open.  When this is so, and it may be said of the 
present case, then the decision of the trial Judge, who has enjoyed the 
advantages not available to the appellate Court, becomes of paramount 
LPSRUWDQFHDQGRXJKWQRWWREHGLVWXUEHG´ 
 
In other words, appellate deference should be shown because the judge at first 
instance is quite simply in a better position than an appeal court to assess the 
credibility of witnesses who appear before him or her.14  The assumption upon 
which this approach is based, that the taking into account of demeanour and 
atmosphere is of genuine assistance in determining credibility, finds little 
support in psychological literature15 but it is a deep-rooted belief in our legal 
culture.16  There are, however, other and stronger reasons ± based on 
pragmatism rather than principle ± justifying appellate deference to first 
instance findings of fact.  In Re B (A Child)17 Lord Neuberger said that the 
appellate deference traditionally shown to first instance findings of fact: 
³FDQ DOVREH MXVWLILHGRQ JURXQGV RISROLF\ SDUWLHV VKRXOGSXW IRUZard 
their best case on the facts at trial and not regard the potential to appeal 
as a second chance), cost (appeals on fact can be expensive), delay 
(appeals on fact often take a long time to get on), and practicality (in 
many cases, it is very hard to ascertain the facts with confidence, so a 
VHFRQGGLIIHUHQWRSLQLRQLVQRPRUHOLNHO\WREHULJKWWKDQWKHILUVW´ 
 
For these reasons, Lord Neuberger concluded that the appellate tribunal will 
interfere with first instance findings in IDFW³RQO\LQDUDUHFDVH´/RUG.HUUput 
                                                          
14 Re B (A  Child) [2013] UKSC 33, per Lord Kerr at [108]. 
15  ? EŝĐŽůƐŽŶ ?  “dƌƵƚŚ ĂŶĚ ĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ P >ŝĨƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ sĞŝů ?  ? ? ? ?   ? ? ĚŝŶ ? > ?Z ?  ? ? ? ?  ^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽ  ?
ůƵŵĞŶƚŚĂů ? “tŝƉĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ĂŶĚƐ ?Ă>ŝĐŬŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝƉƐ PdŚĞsĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ
tŝƚŶĞƐƐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?(1993) 72 Nebraska L. Rev. 1157; d ?ŝŶŐŚĂŵ ? “dŚĞŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:ƵĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Denning L.J. 22 at pp. 29-31. 
16 Though accepting the lack of scientific evidence to support the special reliability of the assessment of 
witnesses made by the judge at first instance, Lord Bingham, op. cit. at p. 30, nevertheless said that 
 “ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂů ũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ƵŶĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ĚƌĂŵĂ ŽĨ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
nevertheless gives him insights denied to those who come later.  It is the advantage which the 
journalist on the scene at the time enjoys over the historian.  And even if the judge may be wrong, no-
ŽŶĞĞůƐĞĐĂŶďĞƐƵƌĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? dŚĞ ůĂƐƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ŝƐƵŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĂďůĞ ?ďƵƚ ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ
said for the implication ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝƐƚŽďĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚƌƵƐƚĞĚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ? 
17  [2013] UKSC 33 at [53].  See also Sanderson v McManus 1997 SC(HL) 55, per Lord Hope at p. 58. 
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the matter rather more strongly when he VWDWHG WKDW ³XQOHVV WKH ILQGLQJ LV
LQVXSSRUWDEOHRQDQ\REMHFWLYHDQDO\VLVLWZLOOEHLPPXQHIURPUHYLHZ´18  Both 
dicta confirm that appellate deference at this first stage is of a high level and 
without being any more precise than that, it can be said with some confidence 
that an appellate tribunal will not interfere merely because its reading of the 
evidence would have inclined it to a different conclusion on the facts. So in Re 
A (Children)19 the judge at first instance had found on the evidence that the 
deliberate infliction of injury upon children by their mother had not been 
proved.  The Court of Appeal held that while the judge could have found, on 
the evidence, that the injuries were non-accidental, he had fully explained why 
he had not so found and so the Court of Appeal could not overturn his decision 
just because the opposite decision had been open to him on the facts as he 
found them. 
 
In a quite different context (whether a disposition of land amounted to a 
gratuitous alienation) Lord Reed reiterated the traditional approach in 
Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd,20 where he concluded that: 
³,Q WKH DEVHQFH RI VRPH RWKHU LGHQWLILDEOH HUURU « D PDWHULDO HUURU RI
law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the 
evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or 
a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court 
will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is 
VDWLVILHGWKDWKLVGHFLVLRQFDQQRWUHDVRQDEO\EHH[SODLQHGRUMXVWLILHG´.21 
 
He went on to point out that that approach was consistent both with existing 
Scottish authority (including Thomas v Thomas and the more recent 
McGraddie v McGraddie22) and with Re B (A Child) itself.  As in McGraddie, 
the question asked of the Court of Session had been whether the first instance 
WULEXQDO¶V FRQFOXVLRQ RQ WKH HYLGHQFH KDG EHHQ ³SODLQO\ ZURQJ´.  The 
                                                          
18 Ibid at [108]. 
19 [2014] 1 FCR 24.  It was stated at [34] that nothing in Re B (A Child) changed the traditional approach 
applied in this case. 
20 [2014] UKSC 41 at [58]-[69]. 
21 Ibid at [67]. 
22 [2013] UKSC 58. 
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appropriateness of this phrase was questioned in Re B (A Child) but in the 
context of findings of fact the language was both endorsed and explained by 
Lord Reed in Henderson: 
³7KHDGYHUE µSODLQO\¶GRHVQRW UHIHU WR WKHGHJUHHRIFRQILGHQFHIHOWE\
the appellate court that it would not have reached the same conclusion 
as the trial judge.  It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, 
that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different 
conclusion.  What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one 
WKDWQRUHDVRQDEOHMXGJHFRXOGKDYHUHDFKHG´23 
 
The Court of Session commented upon /RUG 5HHG¶V Dnalysis in S v S24 as 
follows:  
³7KHFRXUWGRHVQRWunderstand Lord Reed to be seeking to depart from 
the familiar and long-settled approach of the Scottish courts hitherto in 
appeals on matters of fact « :hat he was doing was explaining in 
PRUH PRGHUQ ODQJXDJH WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³SODLQO\ ZURQJ´«  When 
considHULQJUHYHUVLQJDILUVW LQVWDQFHMXGJH¶VILQGLQJV(?LQ(?IDFWWKHUHIRUH
the appellate court should confine itself to situations where it can 
categorise the findings as incapable of being reasonably explained or 
justified in terms of the dicta quoted in Henderson v Foxworth 
Investments (at paras [63] to [65]).  Mere disagreement with the findings 
at first instance will not suffice´. 
 
 
b.  Stage two: challenging findings of law 
Once the judge at first instance has made findings in fact, he or she must then 
make findings of law.  In Scottish child protection cases the matter will most 
commonly arise when a sheriff is hearing an application for a grounds 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ DIWHU JURXQGV RI UHIHUUDO WR D FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJ KDYH EHHQ
denied or not understood and differing interpretations of the relevant paragraph 
in V RI WKH &KLOGUHQ¶V +HDULQJV 6FRWODQG $FW  DUH RIIHUHG E\ WKH
                                                          
23 [2014] UKSC 41 at [62]. 
24 2015 Fam LR 37 at [22]-[23] (emphasis added). 
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parties.25  Beyond the hearing system a question of law might arise when the 
court is asked the correct meaning of the threshold for the making of a 
permanence order in s.84(5)(c)(i) of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 
2007,26 or of a ground for dispensing with parental consent to adoption.27 
 
Now, in a jurisprudential sense, divorced from practice, the interpretation of the 
law calls for a judgment to be made and alternative (even opposing) answers 
to the same question may be rational, reasonable and indeed justifiable, just 
as opposing interpretations of the evidence may be ± for otherwise we would 
be obliged to dismiss all dissents in multi-bench courts as irrational and 
XQUHDVRQDEOH7KDWWKHUHLVQR³SXUHO\´FRUUHFWDQVZHUWRTXHVWLRQVRIODZLV
seen most clearly when a higher court is required to make a policy decision, 
VXFK DV ZKHQ WKH +RXVH RI /RUGV ZHUH DVNHG ZKHWKHU WKH SKUDVH ³OLYLQJ
WRJHWKHUDVKXVEDQGDQGZLIH´ZDVFDSDEOHRILQFOXGLQJDVDPH-sex couple.  In 
1999 that court answered that question in the negative, unanimously;28 at the 
same time it decided (by a majority of three to two) that a same-sex couple 
FDPHZLWKLQWKHFRQFHSWRI³IDPLO\´IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH5HQW$FWs. The two 
dissenters to that latter decision both gave reasoned speeches as to why the 
concept did not, in their view, include same-sex couples. One might (and most 
today would) disagree with the policy underlying the reasoning of the minority 
and how they exercised their judgment, but that does not make their 
conclusion irrational, unreasonable and unjustifiable.  What made the minority 
decision wrong in law was not the weakness of its intellectual justification but 
the fact that a majority of the court held otherwise.  In cases like these it simply 
cannot be said that there was only one possible answer to the question posed 
to the court.  In Fitzpatrick (and examples could of course be multiplied) the 
view of the minority was at the very least arguable in the sense of being 
intellectually defensible ± if for no other reason than that the case was unlikely 
                                                          
25  In W v Schaffer 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 86 at p.88 Sheriff Principal Nicholson described a failure to apply 
the correct statutory test as an error of law. 
26 As in East Lothian Council, Petrs [2012] CSIH 3. 
27 As in P v Lothian Regional Council 1989 SC 200, S v M 1999 SC 388 and S v L 2012 UKSC 30. 
28 Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27. 
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to have reached the highest court otherwise29 ± and that view might have held 
sway by a differently constituted bench.  Yet the very fact that the highest court 
has answered the question it was posed JLYHV LQ OHJDO WHUPV WKH ³FRUUHFW´
answer.  It was wrong in law to say, between 1999 and 2004, that a same-sex 
couple could live together as husband and wife; it has been wrong in law to 




$ ³ULJKW´DQVZHU LVDQDQVZHU WKDW LVVXSSRUWHGE\ OHJDODXWKRULW\ UDWKHU WKDQ
one that is intellectually defensible.  The rule of law itself requires that the legal 
system provides a concrete answer to every legal question ± which becomes 
the ³ULJKW´ answer ± with every other possible answer, rational or irrational, 
reasonable or unreasonable, arguable or unarguable, being equally ³wrong´ 
(until the law is changed by judicial reversal or legislation).  So by a fiction, 
necessary for the integrity of the legal system itself, we accept, first, that the 
law has one clear meaning and, secondly, that the hierarchy of courts carries 
with it a hierarchy of authority.  It follows from this that there is no room for any 
DSSHOODWHGHIHUHQFHWRD ORZHUFRXUW¶VFRQFOXVLRQRQ WKH ODZ LIFKDOOHQJHGRQ
appeal.  As Lord Neuberger put it in Re B (A Child): 
³,QUHODWLRQWR>DQLVVXHRISXUHODZ@WKHIXQFWLRQRI>DQ\DSSHOODWHFRXUW@
is uninhibited by the fact that it is an appellate tribunal.  That is because 
WKHUHLVDVLQJOHµULJKWRUZURQJ¶DQVZHUZKLFKDQDSSHOODWHFRXUWKDVWR
determine for itself, although it often derives assistance from the 
UHDVRQLQJRIWKHFRXUWRUFRXUWVEHORZ´31 
 
Any sheriff, therefore, who adopts an interpretation of one of the grounds of 
UHIHUUDO WRDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJRURI WKHWHVW IRUWKHPDNLQJRIDSHUPDQHQFH
                                                          
29 Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court will be refused if the appeal does not raise any arguable point of 
law of general public importance: Court of Session Act 1988, s.40A(3); Supreme Court Practice Direction 3.3.3.  
In R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21 Lord Neuberger at [52] affirmed ƚŚĂƚ “ŵĂŶǇĐŽƵƌƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ
ŽŶƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇǁŚĞƌĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĞǀĞŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůũƵĚŝĐŝĂůŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ?ŵĂǇƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌ ? ? 
30 [2004] 2 AC 557. 
31 [2013] UKSC 33 at [55]. 
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order, that is contrary to existing authority can expect to be overruled32 unless 
the existing authority is itself overturned; any first instance tribunal that 
determines a legal dispute about which there is no existing authority may hope 
that a higher court agrees with its determination because of the strength of its 
reasoning, but can expect no deference to be shown by an appellate tribunal 
that disagrees with the determination. 
 
c.  Stage three: challenging evaluative judgments 
Once the facts are found, and the correct meaning of the statutory test has 
been identified, the first instance tribunal must then go on to the third stage of 
the threshold question, which is to apply the statutory test to the facts as found.  
This is the stage at which the question is, in its fundaments: Has the threshold 
been crossed?  So for example iIWKHVWDWXWRU\WHVWLVWKDWWKHFKLOG³LVOLNHO\WR
VXIIHU VLJQLILFDQW KDUP´33 the decisions that require to be made are whether 
the established facts indicate such a ³likelihood´, and whether the harm that is 
DVVHVVHG WREH OLNHO\ FDQSURSHUO\EHFKDUDFWHULVHGDV ³VLJQLILFDQW´  Indeed, 
most threshold tests in the child protection legislation demand the making of 
such decisions: s.67 of the &KLOGUHQ¶V +HDULQJV 6FRWODQG $FW , for 
example, lists WKH JURXQGV IRU UHIHUUDO WR D FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJ using such 
evaluative concepts aV³UHDVRQDEOH´³VHULRXV´DQG³OLNHO\´as well as matters of 
fact³OLNHOLKRRGRIVXIIHULQJVLJQLILFDQWKDUP´LVRQHRIWKHWHVWVIRUWKHJUDQWLQJ
of a child protection order in s.38 of the 2011 Act;34 ³VHULRXV GHWULPHQW´
requires to be established before a permanence order may be made under 
s.84(5)(c)(ii) of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007.  The 
determination of whether tests like these are satisfied requires not so much a 
finding in fact but a judgment upon the facts as found. 
 
The appropriate descriptor for decisions of this nature has been a matter of 
some dispute, with different judges in Re B (A Child) using different words to 
describe the process. Lord Wilson and Lady Hale adopted the terminology of a 
                                                          
32 See for example S v Authority Reporter 2012 SLT (Sh Ct) 89 where the sheriff was overruled by the 
Sheriff Principal for misinterpreting existing authority on mens rea. 
33 This was the formulation at issue in Re B (A Child) itself. 
34 Though, that order being unappealable, no issue of appellate deference arises in that context. 
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³YDOXHMXGJPHQW´35 Lord Kerr preferred WKH ODQJXDJHRIDQ³DSSUDLVDO´36 Lord 
1HXEHUJHUVXJJHVWHG³HYDOXDWLRQ´DVWKHDSSURSULDWHFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ37  There 
is unlikely to be any substantive difference in these usages for they are all 
intended, first, to indicate that what is being asked of the judge is not to find a 
fact but to make a judgment about that fact, and secondly to differentiate, at 
least at the conceptual level WKH ILUVW LQVWDQFH WULEXQDO¶VGHFLVLRQDW this third 
stage of the threshold question from the decisions at the previous two stages 
and from the GHFLVLRQ DW WKH RXWFRPH VWDJH  7KH ZRUG ³HYDOXDWLRQ´ ZLOO EH
used in this article because it seems to the present author to encapsulate best 
what each Justice is referring to: the process by which the first instance 
tribunal weighs up whether the facts satisfy the statutory language or not, by 
PDNLQJ D MXGJPHQW FDOO RQ ZKHWKHU VRPHWKLQJ LV ³OLNHO\´ RU ³VHULRXV´ or 
³VLJQLILFDQW´. 
 
The justification for appellate deference to evaluative judgments made by the 
ILUVWLQVWDQFHWULEXQDOLVQRWORFDWHGLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHMXGJH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
the witnesses. Rather it comes from a recognition that the concepts at issue, 
VXFKDV³OLNHOLKRRG´RU³VLJQLILFDQce´are not absolutes: they are of their nature 
matters of judgment rather than of definition.  Words and phrases such as 
these, common throughout the statute book, require ± indeed are designed to 
require38 ± a professional judgment to be made in the context of the facts as 
found, and it is in the nature of professional judgment that there is not a single 
definitive answer but rather a range (sometimes wide, sometimes narrow) of 
answers each one of which can be acceptable or justified.  What is likely and 
significant to one judge may be unlikely and insignificant to another and yet 
both judges may be right ± at least in the sense that neither judge is 
necessarily wrong.  So the question for an appellate tribunal becomes whether 
the evaluation appealed against falls outwith the range of acceptable or 
justifiable answers. Since two different tribunals may come to different, even 
                                                          
35 [2013] UKSC 33 at [44] and [199].  So too did Black LJ in the Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 1475 at 
[9]. 
36 /ďŝĚĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?,ĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂƐĂĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĨĂĐƚ P “ŝt is a 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŵĂĚĞŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐĨŽƵŶĚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĨĂĐƚƵĂůĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?
37 Ibid at [57] and [58].  This terminology was adopted by McFarlane LJ in Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA 
Civ 965 at [44]. 
38 ^ĞĞd ?ŝŶŐŚĂŵ ? “^ŚŽƵůĚWƵďůŝĐ>ĂǁZĞŵĞĚŝĞƐĞŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WƵď ?> ? ? ? ? 
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opposing, evaluations within the acceptable range, any appellate tribunal that 
wishes to overrule a first instance tribunal needs more justification for doing so 
than that it would itself evaluate the facts differently. 
 
The traditional approach to evaluations has been to treat them in the same 
way as outcome decisions and so, as we will see in that context below, to 
SHUPLW D ³JHQHURXV DPELW RI UHDVRQDEOH GLVDJUHHPHQW´ to first instance 
tribunals, with the result that a decision will not be overruled merely because 
the appellate tribunal considers that it is mistaken, but only when the lower 
GHFLVLRQ FDQ EH FKDUDFWHULVHG DV ³SODLQO\ ZURQJ´.  However, the Supreme 
Court, though accepting that an evaluation requires the exercise of judgment, 
unanimously rejected the notion that the evaluation of the first instance tribunal 
needs to be shown to be ³SODLQO\ZURQJ´ to be successfully appealed against.  
Distinguishing between an evaluative judgment on the one hand and a 
MXGJPHQW RI D ³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´ QDWXUH RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG that is one at the 
outcome stage), Lord Wilson stated that the language of a ³JHQHURXVDPELWRI
UHDVRQDEOHGLVDJUHHPHQW´ 
³VHHPV DSW RQO\ WR WKH UHYLHZ RI DQ H[HUFLVH RI GLVFUHWLRQ DV LQ G v 
G39« %XW LW LV JHQHUDOO\ EHWWHU WR DOORZ DGMHFWLYHV WR VSHDN IRU
WKHPVHOYHV ZLWKRXW DGYHUELDO VXSSRUW  :KDW GRHV µSODLQO\¶ DGG WR
µZURQJ¶"  (LWKHU WKH ZRUG DGGV QRWKLQJ RU LW VHUYHV WR WUHDW WKH
determination under challenge with some slight extra level of generosity 
apt to one which is discretionary but not to one which is evaluative.  Like 
all other members of the court, I consider that appellate review of a 
determination whether the threshold is crossed should be conducted by 
UHIHUHQFHVLPSO\WRZKHWKHULWZDVZURQJ´40 
 
Lady Hale came to the same conclusion by focusing on the statutory basis for 
any appeal: 
³,Q UHODWLRQ WR HYDOXDWLQJ ZKHWKHU WKH WKUHVKROG KDV EHHQ FURVVHG ZH
are all agreed that the proper appellate test is whether the trial judge 
                                                          
39 [1985] 1 WLR 647, discussed below. 




CPR 52.11(3) and there is no reason why it should not apply in this 
FRQWH[Wµ3ODLQO\¶ DGGVQRWKLQJKHOSIXO´41  
 
It seems then that, in the view of the Supreme Court, the notion of there being 
D ³JHQHURXV DPELW RI UHDVRQDEOH GLVDJUHHPHQW´ VLPSO\ GRHV QRt apply to 
evaluations: like decisions on the law there is only one right answer, with every 
other possible answer being wrong  7KH ORZHU FRXUW¶V DQVZHU PLJKW EH 
rational, reasonable and justifiable but that is not the question for the appeal 
FRXUW ZKLFK LV ZKHWKHU LW ZDV ³ULJKW´ RU ³ZURQJ´  7KHUH LV KRZHYHU VRPH
artificiality with this approach since words OLNH ³VLJQLILFDQW´ ³VHULRXV´ DQG
³OLNHO\´ DUH not in their nature absolute, and so do not lend themselves to a 
³ULJKW RUZURQJ´ DQVZHU  While the rule of law itself requires that we accept 
exactly this artificiality in relation to a question of law (which, as we saw above, 
is frequently a matter of policy and judgment as much as a matter of absolute 
definition), there is no similar imperative to accept such artificiality in the 
context of evaluation.  To say that evaluations, like questions of law, are either 
right or wrong is true only in the sense that the first instance tribunal must 
come to a definite conclusion as to whether the threshold has been crossed or 
not, just as it must come to a definite conclusion on the law, but applying the 
same sleight of hand to conclude from that that there is only one correct 
evaluation, just as there can be only one correct legal position, would mean 
that, as with findings of law, no appellate deference at all is to be shown.  Yet 
the Supreme Court, unanimous on this point, did not follow its own logic and 
each Justice accepted that some deference was appropriate with evaluations, 
less certainly than for findings in fact, but more than for findings of law.  Three 
of the justices seemed to accept that an appellate court cannot overturn all first 
instance decisions it disagreed with42 and neither of the others said that the 
                                                          
41 Ibid at [202].  See also Lord Clarke at [139]. 
42 >ŽƌĚ<ĞƌƌĂƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƚĂůŬĞĚŽĨ “ĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƌĞƚŝĐĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞƐŚŽǁŶďǇĂƉƉĞůůĂƚĞƚƌŝďƵŶĂůƐ
ĂƐŬĞĚƚŽŽǀĞƌƚƵƌŶĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?>ŽƌĚEĞƵďĞƌŐĞƌƐĂŝĚĂƚ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚũƵƐƚŝĨǇ
a very high hurdle for an appeal on an issue of primary fact apply, often with somewhat less force, in 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĂŶ ĂƉƉĞĂů ŽŶ ĂŶ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? Lady Hale had serious doubts as to whether the 
threshold in Re B (A Child) ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ ĐƌŽƐƐĞĚ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚĞ ĨĞůƚ  “ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
conclusioŶƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐĐŽƵƌƚ ŝƐŶŽƚ ŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ
ǁĂƐĐƌŽƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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appellate court could: in other words an evaluative decision might not be 
³ZURQJ´HYHQDOWKRXJKWKHSupreme Court itself would have come to a different 
conclusion.  The overall result remains, however, a lowering of the level of 
appellate deference to evaluative decisions from that which had previously 
been assumed. 
 
The outcome RIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQon this point seems to be based 
on two considerations, neither of which has much resonance in Scotland.  The 
ILUVW LVWKDWWKH³ULJKWRUZURQJ´ELQDU\LVQHFHVVLWDWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH&LYLO
Procedure Rules lay down as the general ground of appeal that the decision 
ZDV³ZURQJ´ 7KLVargument does not work in Scotland where the ground of 
appeal is either not legislatively specified (as with appeals against permanence 
orders) or expressed in an evaluative rather than an absolutist manner (as with 
appeals tRWKHVKHULIIIURPGHFLVLRQVRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJV).43  The second 
consideration is that the intellectual exercise asked of first instance tribunals 
making evaluative judgments is seen by the Supreme Court as being closer to 
making findings of law (where appellate deference is low) than to making 
findings in fact (where appellate deference is high, being encapsulated in the 
³SODLQO\ ZURQJ´ WHVW ZKRVH FRQWLQXLQJ DXWKRULW\ in Scotland was confirmed in 
both McGraddie and Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd).  The Scottish 
courts seem to regard evaluative judgments as being more analogous to 
findings in fact than to findings of law.  In S, Petitioners,44 which involved the 
question of whether the test had been satisfied for dispensing with parental 
consent to adoption, the Inner House said this: 
³:H FRQVLGHU WKDW ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH LQFDSDFLW\
ground applies, the court is engaged, essentially, in a fact finding 
exercise; what facts are established by the evidence and, on those 
facts, does the court conclude that the relevant parent or guardian is 
unable satisfactorily to discharge [parental responsibilities and parental 
rights]?  Whilst deciding whether or not that is the correct conclusion is, 
we accept, a matter of judgment,45 it will be driven very much by the 
                                                          
43 The ground of appeal in that context is discussed in detail below. 
44 2014 Fam. LR 23. 
45 Cf LoƌĚ<Ğƌƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƋƵŽƚĞĚĂt n.36 above. 
16 
 
facts of the individual case.  That being so, where the findings in fact are 
not challenged and the conclusion is a reasoned one which, on those 
facts, was open to the judge, it will usually be very difficult indeed [for an 
appellate tribunal] to interfere with that part of the overall decision-
making process´46 
 
7KLV GHFLVLRQ JLYHQ D \HDU DIWHU WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Re B (A 
Child), suggests that the Scottish approach to evaluative decisions is to see 
them as closer to findings in fact than to findings of law and thereby to accord 
them a higher degree of appellate deference than the Supreme Court would 
accord evaluative decisions of English courts or tribunals.47  However, 
evaluations require a different thought-process from either decisions of fact or 
decisions of law: they require a judgment to be made on the nature of the 
facts. What can be taken from cases like S, Petitioners is that the Scottish 
courts will continue to afford an ambit of reasonable disagreement to first 
instance evaluations: the breadth of that ambit may well be greater than in 
England where it is statutorily constrained. 
 
d.  Stage four: challenging outcome decisions 
Once it has been established that the threshold has been crossed, in the 
sense that the first instance tribunal has determined that the statutory test, 
correctly construed, has been met by the facts as found, that (or sometimes 
another) tribunal must then move on to the final question, which is what, if any, 
order should be made in response to the crossing of the threshold.  This might 
be characterised as the ³RXWFRPH GHFLVLRQ´ which requires of the decision-
maker a judgment as to what outcome will best serve the needs of the child.  It 
has long been accepted that an appellate tribunal is not able to overturn such a 
                                                          
46 Ibid at [29], emphasis added. 
47 In West Lothian Council v M 2002 SC 411 Lord Justice Clerk Gill at [65] talked of the need to show 
 “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞƌƌŽƌ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞĂŶĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚ ?  In G v M 1999 SC 439 the Inner 
House helĚ ŝƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ŽǀĞƌƌƵůĞ Ă ƐŚĞƌŝĨĨ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉĂƌĞŶƚĂů ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ƚŽ
ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞŽƵƚŽŶůǇŝĨƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŚĞƌŝĨĨ “ŚĂĚĐůĞĂƌůǇŐŽŶĞǁƌŽŶŐ ? ?ĂƚƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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decision merely because it would have preferred another.48  This was not 
denied in Re B (A Child).  Lord Wilson said this: 
³7KHIXQFWLRQRIWKHIDPLO\MXGJHLQDFKLOGFDVHWUDQVFHQGVWKHQHHGWR
decide issues of fact; and so his (or her) advantage over the appellate 
court transcends the conventional advantage of the fact-finder who has 
seen and heard the witnesses of fact.  In a child case the judge 
develops a face-to-face, bench-to-witness-box, acquaintance with each 
of the candidates for the care of the child.  Throughout their evidence 
his function is not to asNKLPVHOIMXVWµLVWKLVWUXH"¶RUµLVWKLVVLQFHUH"¶EXW
µZKDWGRHVWKLVHYLGHQFHWHOOPHDERXWDQ\IXWXUHSDUHQWLQJRIWKHFKLOG
E\ WKLVZLWQHVV"¶DQG LQDSXEOLF ODZFDVHZKHQDOZD\VKRSLQJ WREH
DEOH WRDQVZHUKLVTXHVWLRQQHJDWLYHO\ WRDVN µDUH WKH ORFDODXWKRULW\¶V
concerns about the future parenting of the child by this witness 
MXVWLILHG"¶7KHIXQFWLRQGHPDQGVDKLJKGHJUHHRIZLVGRPRQWKHSDUWRI
WKH IDPLO\ MXGJH « EXW WKH FRUROODU\ LV WKH GLIILFXOW\ RI PRXQWLQJ D
successful appeal against a judJH¶V GHFLVLRQ DERXW WKH IXWXUH
DUUDQJHPHQWVIRUDFKLOG´49 
 
However, at the same time, a long line of authority that set the level of 
appellate deference E\ UHIHUHQFH WR D ³JHQHURXV DPELW RI UHDVRQDEOH
GLVDJUHHPHQW´ was dismissed as inapplicable on the ground that it dealt with a 
different type of outcome decision.  This line of authority is exemplified by 
Jackson v Murray50 decided 18 months after Re B (A Child).  Lord Reed, with 
whom Lady Hale and Lord Carnworth agreed, put the matter thus: 
³,Q WKHDEVHQFHRIDQLGHQWLILDEOHHUURUVXFKDVDQHUURURI ODZRU WKH
taking into account of an irrelevant matter, or the failure to take account 
of a relevant matter, it is only a difference of view «which exceeds the 
ambit of reasonable disagreement that warrants the conclusion that the 
court below has gone wrong.  In other words, in the absence of an 
identifiable error, the appellate court must be satisfied that the 
                                                          
48 G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647, per Lord Fraser, at p.651, cited with approval by Lord Reed in Jackson v 
Murray [2015] UKSC 5 at [31]. 
49 [2013] UKSC 33 at [42]. 
50 [2015] UKSC 5. 
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apportionment made by the court below was not one which was 
UHDVRQDEO\RSHQWRLW´51   
 
7KH SKUDVH ³JHQHURXV DPELW RI UHDVRQDEOH GLVDJUHHPHQW´, encapsulating a 
high level of appellate deference, seems to have been first used by Asquith LJ 
in Bellenden (Satterthwaite) v Satterthwaite.52  +HSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³LWLVRIWKH
essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds 
PLJKW UHDFKZLGHO\GLIIHUHQWGHFLVLRQVZLWKRXWHLWKHUEHLQJDSSHDODEOH´  That 
widely differing outcomes may each be unappealable was accepted in Re B (A 
Child) to be appropriate only in respect of decisions that could be described as 
³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´, of which Jackson v Murray is a clear example.  That case 
concerned the apportionment of liability in a case of contributory negligence; 
Bellenden was a matter of assessing maintenance to be paid between 
divorcing spouses; G v G,53 which is the major authority in family law cases for 
affording a generous ambit of reasonable disagreement to first instance 
tribunals, was a question of custody (residence) of a child.  All of these types of 
decision have in common that the first instance tribunal is asked to make a 
decision that is not of its nature open to verifiable proof of its correctness, and 
while this is perhaps more obviously so in cases like Jackson and Bellenden 
(where the discretion is relatively unfettered54), both Lord Wilson and Lady 
Hale in Re B (A Child)55 HQGRUVHG WKH DSSHOODWLRQ ³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´ WR WKH
residence decision in G v G.  Lord President Rodger, however, had some 
years earlier taken LVVXH ZLWK WKH WHUPLQRORJ\ RI ³GLVFUHWLRQ´ LQ FDVHV RI WKat 
type.  In Osborne v Matthan (No 2) he said: 
³,WDSSHDUVWRPHKRZHYHUWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZKLFKDWULDOMXGJHUHDFKHV
on custody may perhaps be better described not as a matter of 
discretion but as a matter of judgment exercised on consideration of the 
                                                          
51 At [35]. 
52 [1948] 1 All ER 343 at p.345. 
53 [1985] 1 WLR 647.  LorĚ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĞƌĞ was approved by the Inner House in Britten v Central 
Regional Council 1986 SLT 207 and S v S 2012 Fam LR 32 at [12]. 
54 A decision whether to allow an action to proceed out of time, under s.19A of the Prescription and 
>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŽŝŶ  ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ŝƐ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƐŽƌƚ ŽĨ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ŝƐapparently 
unfettered.  In EA v GN [2015] CSIH 26 the Inner House ƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?Ɛ
exercise of his discretion in that context, citing with approval Thomson v Glasgow Corporation 1962 
SC(HL) 36. 
55 [2013] UKSC 33 at [44] and [203] respectively. 
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relevant factors. The court must consider all the relevant circumstances 
and decide what the welfare of the child requires. Once the court has 
identified that, it has no discretion: the court must do what the welfare of 
WKHFKLOGUHTXLUHV´56 
 
The importance of the point is that the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) held 
WKDW WKH ³JHQHURXV DPELW RI UHDVRQDEOH GLVDJUHHPHQW´ WHVW IRU DSSHOODWH
deference (the true meaning, according to Lord Fraser in G v G,57 of the 
³SODLnO\ ZURQJ´ VWDQGDUG applied only to outcome decisions that could be 
GHVFULEHG DV ³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´ while other outcome decisions were to be 
accorded a degree of deference on a par with that accorded to the evaluative 
SDUWRIWKHWKUHVKROGGHFLVLRQ/RUG:LOVRQIHOW³GULYHQWRMHWWLVRQWKHSULQFLSOHV
in G v G´,58 seeing no conceptual difference between the judgment the first 
instance tribunal was asked to make at the evaluative stage of the threshold 
question and the judgment required of that tribunal at the outcome stage.  This 
led him to conclude that the level of appellate deference ought to be the same: 
³7KHUH LV WKHUHIRUH DQ DWWUDFWLYH V\PPHWU\ EHWZHHQ WKH FULWHULRQ IRU
review of a determination of whether the threshold is crossed and that 
for review of a determination of whether a care order should be made.  
In each case it is no more and no less than whether the determination is 
ZURQJ´59 
 
To this conclusion both Lord Neuberger60 and Lord Clarke61 adhere. 
 
<HWWKDW³DWWUDFWLYHV\PPHWU\´FRPHVDWDFRVWa differentiation between what 
a court is asked to do in a private law case like G v G and what it is asked to 
                                                          
56  1998 SC 682 at 688-689. 
57 [1985] 1 WLR 647 at p. 652. 
58 [2013] UKSC 33 at [46].  Lord Kerr, however, at [118], explicitly endorsed the affording of a generous 
ambit of reasonable disagreement in this context (at least where proportionality is not in issue).  
59 Ibid at [47]. 
60 Ibid at [88]. >ŽƌĚEĞƵďĞƌŐĞƌĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂƐĂůƐŽďĞŝŶŐĂŶ  “ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
61 Ibid at [139]. 
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do in a child protection case.62  That distinction is illusory, as indeed is the 
GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´ DQG RWKHU RXWFRPH GHFLVLRQs. Lord 
Bingham, writing extra-judicially, described FXVWRG\ QRZ UHVLGHQFH DV ³WKH
ODVW UHDO VWURQJKROG RI DOPRVW XQUHYLHZDEOH GLVFUHWLRQ´63  Whitty64 likewise 
describes residence disputes DV ³RQH RI WKH JUHDW EDVWLRQV RI MXGLFLDO
GLVFUHWLRQ´%RWKVWDWHPHQWVRQHEHIRUHDQGRQHDIWHU/RUG3UHVLGHQW5RGJHU¶
terminological correction) may put the matter rather too highly but the point of 
importance is that what is true for residence disputes is just as true for 
applications by the public authorities for orders designed to secure the 
protection of children from their parents. Both are governed by the statutory 
rules requiring WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH WR EH WKH SDUDPRXQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQ65 and 
both require a weighing up of options against the very real harm that any court 
intervention (whether in public law or in private law process) will do.  Both 
GHFLVLRQVDUH ³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´DQGERWKRXJKW WKHUHIRUH WRDWWUDFWDJHQHURXV
ambit of reasonable disagreement when challenged.  A better determinant of 
whether judicial decision-making is suitable for a generous ambit of reasonable 
GLVDJUHHPHQWWKDQZKHWKHUWKHGHFLVLRQLV³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´RUQRWLVZKHWKHUWKH
decision can be made in a mechanical fashion by applying a straight rule, or 
not.  If so the matter becomes one of applying the law correctly and no 
appellate deference is appropriate; if not, because there can (in the nature of 
the case) be no absolutely right or wrong answer, then appellate deference is 
justified.  The Scottish courts continue WR DSSO\ WKH ³SODLQO\ ZURQJ´ WHVW LQ
appeals against outcome decisions in both private law cases66 and public law 
cases.67 
 
                                                          
62 It had previously been accepted that the same level of appellate deference required to be shown to 
the outcomes in public law cases as in private law cases: Re C (Adoption: Best Interests of the Child) 
[2009] EWHC 499, per Potter P at [33].  In the private law case of G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 Lord Fraser 
explicitly built upon the dicta of Lord Scarman in the public law case of B v W (Wardship: Appeal) 
[1979] 1 WLR 1041 at p. 1055.  And in W v Aberdeenshire Council 2013 SC 108 the approach in G v G 
was followed by the Court of Session in an appeal relating to an application for a permanence order. 
63 Ibid at p. 41. 
64 E ?tŚŝƚƚǇ ? “&ƌŽŵZƵůĞƐƚŽŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ PŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ĂďƌŝĐŽĨ^ĐŽƚƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŝŶ ?> ?Z ?
281 at 333. 
65 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s. ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ?ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?s.25(2). 
66 See for example JM v PK [2015] CSIH 54 at [35]. 
67 In W v Aberdeenshire Council 2013 SC 108 the Inner House held that the sheriff principal had been 
right to overrule the outcome decision of thĞƐŚĞƌŝĨĨďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐ “ƉůĂŝŶůǇǁƌŽŶŐ ? ? 
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It is obvious that a decision on apportionment of responsibility in a case of 
contributory negligence or the valuation of a maintenance claim can have no 
verifiably correct answer but it is just as true, if less obviously so, that a 
decision relating to DFKLOG¶VUHVLGHQFHRUFRQWDFW LVVHOGRPDEVROXWHO\FHUWDLQ
to be either right or wrong.  The decision of whether a non-resident parent 
should have contact with a child once a month or once a week is as 
³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´ ± ³RSHQ-ended´ PLJKW EH EHWWHU ± as the decision of whether 
contributory negligence amounts to 50% or 90% of the cause of an accident, 
and the approach to appellate deference in Jackson v Murray68 should apply to 
both.  Likewise in a child protection case, the first instance tribunal is required 
to assess and compare various possible outcomes and will seldom be faced 
with a case in which only one of the practical options is palpably and 
undeniably better than all the others. As Lord Nicholls put it in Re B (A Minor) 
(Adoption: Natural Parent):69 
³7KHUHLVQRREMHFWLYHO\FHUWDLQDQVZHUWRZKLFKRIWZRRUPRUHSRVVLEOH
courses is in the best interests of a child.  In all save the most straight-
forward cases, there are competing factors, some pointing one way and 
some another.  There is no means of demonstrating that one answer is 
clearly right and another clearly wrong.  There are too many 
uncertainties involved in what, after all, is an attempt to peer into the 
future and assess the advantages and disadvantages which this or that 
FRXUVHZLOORUPD\KDYHIRUWKHFKLOG´ 
 
Lord Rodger was of course perfectly correct to say in Osborne v Matthan that 
once the best outcome for the FKLOG¶VZHOIDUHKDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGWKHFRXUWKDV
no discretion and is obliged to decide in favour of that outcome, but it does not 
follow from this that the identification of the best outcome is devoid of judicial 
discretion.  ³-XGLFLDOGLVFUHWLRQ´ZDVGHfined by Barak70 DV³WKHSRZHUWKHODZ
gives the judge to choose among several alternatives, each of them being 
ODZIXO´ ZKLFK FDQ FOHDUO\ HQFRPSDVV GHFLVLRQV RQ DSSRUWLRQPHQW RI OLDELOLW\ 
and, equally, on which of various options are more suitable for a child in need 
                                                          
68 [2015] UKSC 5. 
69 [2002] 1 WLR 258 at [16]. 




of the word, is that it implies a power of choice.71  However, in few areas where 
judges exercise discretion is their choice completely free, and it is certainly not 
in relation to either private law or public law disputes relating to children.  In 
both types of case the tribunal is constrained by the requirement to regard the 
welfare of the child as the paramount consideration; additionally in public law 
(child protection) cases the tribunal is constrained to choose an outcome that 
is proportionate to the legitimate aim it seeks to achieve.72  That there is no 
wholly free choice has long been recognised.73  But choices still have to be 
made both as to the factors that are relevant to welfare and as to the weight 
each factor is to be accorded.  Whether the weighing of the relevant factors in 
a child protection case is best described as exercising discretion or as making 
a judgment is less important ± for the process clearly has elements of both74 ± 
than the fact that the required weighing is a matter for the first instance tribunal 
and that  
³LWLVQRWIRU>DQDSSHOODWHWULEXQDO@WRUHDVVHVVWKHZHLJKWWREHDWWDFKHG
to the various considerations placed before [the first instance tribunal 
ZKLFK KDV@ WKH DGYDQWDJHV RI « FORVH DQG GLUHFW IDPLOLDULW\ ZLWK WKH
SDUWLHVDQG WKHRWKHUZLWQHVVHV«:HFRQVLGHU WKDW WKHZHLJKW WREH
attached to these factors in a particular case is a matter for the judge at 
ILUVWLQVWDQFH´75 
 
                                                          
71 See Lady Hale in Re M and anor (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55 at [39]. 
72 Indeed that consideration may also constrain decision-makers in a private law dispute because the 
denial of contact (for example) may interfere with article 8 rights whether effected by private law or 
public law process: Elsholz v Germany (2002) 34 EHRR 58 at ([42]  W [44]), cited in JM v PK [2015] CSIH 
54. 
73 See Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App. Cas.709, per Lord Blackburn at p. 728.  Lady Hale in Re B (A Child) 
Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ P “dŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨŝƚ ?ĂĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ.  But it is a discretion in 
which the requirements, not only of the Children Act 1989, but also of proportionality under the 
,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ŵƵƐƚďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ? In Lothian Regional Council v A 1992 SLT 858 at p.862 
Lord President Hope said of the cŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉĂƌĞŶƚĂů ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ƚŽ
adoption:  “ƚƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŐĞĂĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚďĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐƉůĂŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŵƵƐƚ
ĚŽǁŚĂƚƐ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨƚhe child as the 
first consideration).  >ŽƌĚ,ŽƉĞŝƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŝŶŐ “ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚ “ĨƌĞĞĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ? 
74 Lord Kerr in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 at [111] was talking about outcome decisions when he 
ƐĂŝĚ P “/ŶƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƉĂƌƚĂŬĞƐŽĨĂŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ĞĞ
also West Lothian Regional Council v M 2002 SC 411 where Lord Justice Clerk Gill described the 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŽĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞǁŝƚŚƉĂƌĞŶƚĂůĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƚŽĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ “ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? 
 ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞŽĨ “ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?   
75 FB and AB, Petitioners 1999 Fam LR 2 (IH) at [2.19]. 
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The justification for appellate deference, and the setting of its level, is therefore 
found QRW LQ WKH IDFW WKDW D GHFLVLRQ LV ³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´ EXW LQ WKH IDFW WKDW Lt 
requires the making of choices between outcomes with which rational and 
reasonable people may disagree.76  This being so, it becomes of crucial 
importance to know whose choice counts. And that leads us to the most 
important reason why the appellate tribunal must allow a generous ambit of 
reasonable disagreement in the context of outcome decisions ± a reason of 
particular significance in Scotland.  In Clarke-Hunt v Newcombe Cumming-
Bruce LJ said this: 
³7KHUHZDVQRWUHDOO\DULJKWVROXWLRQWKHUHZHUHWZRDOWHUQDWLYHZURQJ
solutions. The problem of the judge was to appreciate the factors 
pointing in each direction and to decide which of the two bad solutions 
was the least dangerous, having regard to the long-term interests of the 
children, and so he decided the latter.  Whether I would have decided it 
the same way if I had been in the position of the trial judge I do not 
know.  I might have taken the same course as the judge and I might not, 
but I was never in that situation.  I am sitting in the Court of Appeal 
deciding a quite different question: has it been shown that the judge to 
whom Parliament has confided the exercise of discretion, plainly got the 
ZURQJDQVZHU",HPSKDVLVHWKHZRUGµSODLQO\¶´77 
 
We see here an important constitutional doctrine at play.  Because an outcome 
needs to be determined in circumstances in which there will seldom be only 
one rational and reasonable outcome, it becomes of crucial importance to 
identify who is lawfully appointed to determine the outcome: who, in other 
words, has been given the power to make the appropriate choice by 
Parliament.78  Any appellate body that simply substitutes its own judgment for 
those that it disagrees with is similarly subverting an important constitutional 
principle: that decisions are to be made by the bodies chosen by Parliament to 
                                                          
76DĂŶǇũƵĚŐĞƐĂƌĞƵŶĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ “ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?ĂƐƐĞĞŶŝŶůĂŶWĂƚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ
with the Law Lords in Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart, 2013) at pp. 
269-271.  But that discomfort stems from the implication that the choice is free and unconstrained 
which, as explained in the text above, it is not. 
77 (1982) 4 FLR 482 (approved by Lord Fraser in G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 at p. 651). 
78 In a quite different context, this constitutional doctrine was affirmed in R (Evans) v Attorney General 
[2015] UKSC 21. 
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make them.79  This principle is particularly apt to apply to WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKearing 
system in Scotland, where the first instance and the appellate tribunal are not 
simply different manifestations (or larger benches) of the same court but are 
fundamentally different bodies. The principle is given effect to by affording a 
generous ambit of reasonable disagreement to first instance tribunal decisions 
on outcome. 
 
Of course WKH³JHQHURXVDPELW´DSSURDFKZDVUHMHFWHGE\ the Supreme Court 
in Re B (A Child) at least in respect of English child protection processes. 
However, the Court ignores a crucial distinction between the two types of 
decision and one, indeed, that suggests that appellate oversight ought if 
anything to be stronger (and appellate deference correspondingly weaker) for 
evaluative decisions than for outcome decisions. The difference is this. A 
threshold evaluation has the potential to create a precedent, and it follows that 
the higher courts have a direct interest in ensuring that evaluations are 
calibrated properly, and orientated to the direction in which they want the law 
to develop.80  An outcome decision on the other hand, even when made by the 
highest court in the land, is the outcome that is considered best for the 
particular child, and that outcome itself can never (unlike the law whose 
application has determined it) have any precedential value because what is 
best for one child in one case tells us nothing about whether the same 
outcome would be best for another child in the necessarily different context of 
any other case.  The appellate tribunal therefore has no ability to develop the 
law by either upholding or interfering with the first instance outcome decision: it 
has, in other words, less standing to interfere.  This being so, the level of 
deference that it should show to first instance decisions on outcome must be at 
least as high as for evaluative decisions: the outcome determined by the body 
                                                          
79 It was accepted in R (Evans) v Attorney General that this principle could be reversed by explicit 
statutory provision ?ŝĨŝƚŝƐ “ĐƌǇƐƚĂůĐůĞĂƌ ?: per Lord Neuberger at [58].  A Scottish example would be the 
power of the cŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƵŶĚĞƌ Ɛs. ? ? Žƌ  ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ 
(Scotland) Act 2011 of a child protection order, which can be brought to an end whenever the 
reviewing body, in its own judgment, considers that the grounds for its making are not made out  W 
irrespective of the fact that a sheriff has previously determined that they were made out: see s.47. 
80 See, for example, the important guidance given by the House of Lords and Supreme Court as to the 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ  “ůŝŬĞůǇ ?ĂƐ ŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ŝŶŵƵĐŚĐŚŝůĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: 




chosen by Parliament to exercise judgment should stand until such time as the 
outcome is shown to be beyond the generous ambit of reasonable 






FKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ IRU WKDWERG\GHDOVZLWK WKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIVXFKFDVHV81
7KH KHDULQJ KDV QR UROH LQ WKUHVKROG GHFLVLRQV DW OHDVW LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH
JURXQGV XSRQ ZKLFK WKH FKLOG LV UHIHUUHG WR D KHDULQJ EXW LV FRQFHUQHG
SULPDULO\ZLWKGHWHUPLQLQJWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHFDVH7KHKHDULQJKDVGLVFUHWLRQ
LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH RXWFRPH LQ WKH VHQVH RI KDYLQJ D FKRLFH RI ZKHWKHU WR
PDNHYDU\RUFRQWLQXHDFRPSXOVRU\VXSHUYLVLRQRUGHURUQRWDQGLWVWHUPV,Q






7KH KHDULQJ¶V RXWFRPH GHFLVLRQV PD\ EH DSSHDOHG XQGHU V RI WKH
&KLOGUHQ¶V +HDULQJV 6FRWODQG $FW  WR WKH VKHULII WKRXJK LW LV QRW
completely self-evident that the deference a sheriff dealing with such an appeal 
RXJKWWRVKRZWRWKHKHDULQJ¶VGHFLVLRQLVJRYHUQHGE\WKHVDPHSULQFLSOHVDV
those discussed above.  There are at least two considerations peculiar to 
GLVSRVLWLYHGHFLVLRQVE\FKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJVZKLFKcarry their own implications.  
 
First, the hearing is not a court of law but is instead a quasi-judicial tribunal, 
with lawful powers of course but staffed by laypersons with little formal legal 
training.  This might suggest that appellate deference, based at least to some 
                                                          
81 It is true that the most extreme forms of state interference in family life, which involve a child being 
permanently removed from its parents, can be effected only by order of the sheriff or the Court of 
Session, by means of either a permanence order or an adoption order under the Adoption and Children 
 ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨĂĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƚŽ interfere in family life is not to be 
under-estimated.  For a detailed account, see Norrie, ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ (3rd edn., 2013). 
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extent on an understanding of common professional courtesy underpinned by 
a shared training and experiential background, is less appropriate than it is 
ZLWKDSSHDOV IURPFRXUWVRI ODZ +RZHYHU ³SURIHVVLRQDO FRXUWHV\´KDVEHHQ
recognised as a not particularly solid justification for appellate deference,82 and 
deference has been extended to decisions of other lay tribunals.83  Much more 
important is the relationship with the child and other actors in the dispute 
developed by the first instance tribunal, as recognised by Lord Wilson in Re B 
(A Child).84  While he was talking within the context of the peculiar role 
dHPDQGHGRID³IDPLO\MXGJH´PRUHLQWLPDWHZLWKWKHDFWRUVLQWKHGLVSXWHWKDQ
in most other types of court action, these comments apply with even greater 
force to FKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJVLQ6FRWODQGZKHUHWKHZKROHGHVLJQRIWKHV\VWHP
aims to ensure that D PXFK PRUH ³KDQGV-RQ´ DSSURDFK WR DGMXGLFDWLRQ is 
adopted by this lay panel than is possible in any court of law. 
 
Secondly, unlike with general appeals from a court of first instance to an 
DSSHDOFRXUWDSSHDOV IURPDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ WRDVKHULIIKDYHD ground of 
appeal laid down in the governing legislation.  This changes the nature of the 
debate, for the issue becomes less whether the limits of appellate deference 
(wherever they are set) have been exceeded and more whether the statutory 
ground for appeal has been made out.  This indeed is the basis of the 
judgments of Lord Clarke and Lady Hale in Re B (A Child):85 for both, the 
primary reason why appellate tribunals should not limit themselves to 
RYHUWXUQLQJRQO\GHFLVLRQVWKH\FRQVLGHU³SODLQO\ZURQJ´ was that the (English) 
Civil Procedure Rules provide that an appeal court can RYHUUXOHDORZHUFRXUW¶V
decision that it considers WREHVLPSO\³ZURQJ´7KHVWDWXWRU\WHVWIRUDSSHDOV
WRVKHULIIVIURPGLVSRVLWLYHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJLVGLIIHUHQWXQGHU
s.156 of the 2011 Act an appeal must be rejected (and the imperative is to be 
noted) if the sheriff considers the decision being appealed against to be 
³MXVWLILHG´  So a sheriff needs to askQRWZKHWKHUWKHRXWFRPHZDV³ZURQJ´EXW
ZKHWKHULWZDV³MXVWLILHG´  These are, conceptually, entirely different questions. 
                                                          
82 Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1996] UKHL 18, per Lord Hoffmann at [54].  
83 See Sneddon v Scottish Legal Complaints Commission [2015] CSIH 62 at [34]. 
84  n.49 above. 




7KH YHU\ XVH RI WKH ZRUG ³MXVWLILHG´ Vuggests that what is at issue is the 
exercise (constrained, of course) of a discretion.  It is in the nature of a 
discretion that how it is exercised may be justified or not, while a conclusion on 
a point of law may be right or wrong.  This was recognised by the House of 
Lords in Thomas v Glasgow Corporation,86 and by the Court of Session.87  The 
word has therefore been used both judicially and legislatively in contexts which 
ODFNWKHDEVROXWLVWFRQQRWDWLRQVRID³ULJKWRUZURQJ´ELQDU\:KLOHWKHKHDULQJ
must make its decision as to which outcome it considers to be best for the 
child, that assessment is, in its fundaments, a matter of opinion ± reached by 
the exercise of judgment rather by a search for absolute truths. If the hearing 
decides that Outcome A is the best for the child, it is nothing to the point that 
either another hearing or a sheriff considers Outcome B to be the best.  The 
question for the sheriff is whether, in the exercise of its judgment, the hearing 
chose an outcome that can be justified.  The judgment reached as to what is 
the best option can seldom be adjudged right or wrong but can always be 
adjudged supportable or insupportable.  It follows that in determining whether 
DQRXWFRPHGHFLVLRQRIDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ LV ³MXVWLILHG´ WKHVKHULIIQHHGV WR
show a greater level of appellate deference than was allowed by the Supreme 




ThDW WKHKHDULQJ¶VGHFLVLRQZDV ³QRW MXVWLILHG´ has been the statutory ground 
for appeal since the commencement of the hearings system,88 and in that time 
has been subject to some judicial analysis, but so far not beyond sheriff court 
OHYHO 6KRUWO\DIWHU WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDring system came into operation Sheriff 
                                                          
86 1962 SC(HL) 136 per Lord Reid at p. 66 P “ ?d ?ŚŝƐ,ŽƵƐĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŽǀĞƌƌƵůĞƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůŽǁĞƌ
court merely because we might think that we would have ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚ ŝƚ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ  ? tĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĚŽ ŝĨ
some irrelevant factor had been taken into account, or some important relevant factor left out of 
account, or if the decision was unreasonable, and we would no doubt do so if the decision could be 
said to be unjustŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?
87 P v Aberdeenshire Council 2001 Fam. L.R. 127 at [11], where the court held that a decision on 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Ă ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉĂƌĞŶƚĂů ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ  “ĨƵůůǇ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?.  In W v 
Aberdeenshire Council 2013 SC 108 at [29] the phrase used was  “ƉůĂŝŶůǇũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?. 
88 Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.49(5); Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.51(5). 
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Mowat, discussing the extent to which sheriffs ought to show appellate 
deference to the hearing, said this: 
³$ VKHULII VKRXOG QRW LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ >RI WKH KHDULQJ@
VLPSO\EHFDXVHKHIHOWDQRWKHUIRUPRIWUHDWPHQWPLJKWEHSUHIHUDEOH«
Accordingly, I consider that a sheriff should not allow an appeal unless 
there was some flaw in the procedure adopted by the hearing or he was 
satisfied that the hearing had not given proper consideration to some 
IDFWRULQWKHFDVH´89 
 
Wilkinson and Norrie took from this dictum that two opposing points of view 
PD\HDFKEH³MXVWLILHG´IURPZKLFK LWIROORZHG³WKDWWKHVKHULIIFDQQRWVXEVWLWXWH
his own opinion for that of the hearing merely because he disagrees with it but 
PXVWLIWKHDSSHDOLVWREHDOORZHGKDYHVRPHJURXQGVRQZKLFKWKHKHDULQJ¶V
decLVLRQ FDQ MXVWO\ EH LPSXJQHG´90  The matter was revisited by Sheriff 
Principal Nicholson in W v Schaffer91 who said, in an appeal against an 
outcome decision of the hearing: 
³7KHWDVNIDFLQJDVKHULII WRZKRPDQDSSHDOKDVEHHQWDNHQ LVQRW WR
UHFRQVLGHU WKH HYLGHQFH ZKLFK ZDV EHIRUH WKH KHDULQJ ZLWK D YLHZ WR
PDNLQJKLVRZQGHFLVLRQRQWKDWHYLGHQFH,QVWHDGWKHVKHULII¶VWDVNLV
WRVHH LI WKHUHKDVEHHQVRPHSURFHGXUDO LUUHJXODULW\ LQ WKHFRQGXFWRI
WKHFDVH WRVHHZKHWKHU WKHKHDULQJKDV IDLOHG WRJLYHSURSHURUDQ\
FRQVLGHUDWLRQWRDUHOHYDQWIDFWRULQWKHFDVHDQGLQJHQHUDOWRFRQVLGHU




7KLV VWDWHPHQW KDV VXEVHTXHQWO\ EHFRPH VRPHWKLQJ FORVH WR D PDQWUD IRU
UHVSRQGHQWV LQ DSSHDOV IURP FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJV92 EXW WKH ,QQHU +RXVH
H[SUHVVHG VRPH FDXWLRQ DQG VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH TXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU ZKDW ZDV
                                                          
89 D v Sinclair 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 47 at 48. 
90 Wilkinson and Norrie, Parent and Child 3rd edn., 2013 at [19.23]. 
91 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 86 at pp.87-88. 
92 See for example AM & SO v Brechin [2015] SCGLA 52 at [29]; GD, Appellant 2014 SCFAL 5 at [36]; M v 
Authority Reporter 2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 57 at [35]; A v H 2013 GWD 32-634 (Official Transcript, para [31]); C 




7KDW FDXWLRQ LV LW LV VXEPLWWHG PLVSODFHG  6KHULII 3ULQFLSDO 1LFKROVRQ¶V
IRUPXODWLRQ UHFRJQLVHV WKDW WKHUH LV QR ULJKW DQG ZURQJ DQVZHU WR ZKDW D
KHDULQJ LV DVNHG WR GHFLGH MXVW DV WKHUH LV QR QHFHVVDULO\ ULJKW DQG ZURQJ
DQVZHU IRU D FRXUW FKDUJHG ZLWK GHWHUPLQLQJ ZLWK ZKRP D FKLOG LV WR OLYH RU
ZKDW OHYHO RI FRQWDFW D QRQ-UHVLGHQW SDUHQW VKRXOG KDYH ZLWK D FKLOG DIWHU
SDUHQWDO VHSDUDWLRQ  7KHUH DUH RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG UHDVRQDEOH DQG
XQUHDVRQDEOH YLHZV VXSSRUWDEOHDQG XQVXSSRUWDEOH RSLQLRQV DQG RXWFRPHV
WKDWFDQEH MXVWLILHGRQ WKH IDFWVDQGRXWFRPHV WKDWFDQQRWEH MXVWLILHG 7KH
FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJ PXVW WKHUHIRUH EH DEOH WR PDNH GHFLVLRQV ZKLFK D VKHULII
ZRXOGGLVDJUHHZLWKZLWKRXW WKDWGHFLVLRQEHLQJYXOQHUDEOH WRRYHUWXUQLQJRQ
DSSHDO IRU WKDW UHDVRQ DORQH  ,I WKH RXWFRPH LV RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG
XQUHDVRQDEOHLQWKHVHQVHRIEHLQJRQHWKDWLVRXWZLWKWKHDPELWRIUHDVRQDEOH
GLVDJUHHPHQW RU LW FDQQRW EH VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH IDFWV94 WKHQ LW ZLOO EH DQ
XQMXVWLILHGGHFLVLRQDQGDQDSSHDODJDLQVWLWZLOOEHVXFFHVVIXO,IDSSHDOVDUH
OLPLWHGWRWKRVHZKLFKRQQRUHDVRQDEOHYLHZFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVMXVWLILHGWKHQ
D KHDULQJ¶V GHFLVLRQ LV LQ QR GLIIHUHQW SRVLWLRQ LQ SUDFWLFH WKRXJK VOLJKWO\
GLIIHUHQWZRUGVDUHXVHGIURPDGLVSRVLWLYHGHFLVLRQRIDVKHULIILQDUHVLGHQFH
RUFRQWDFWGLVSXWH7KHRUWKRGR[UXOHDSSOLHV±ZKHWKHUWUDFHGWR:Y6FKDIIHU
RU WR * Y * ± DQG D JHQHURXV DPELW RI UHDVRQDEOH GLVDJUHHPHQW LV WR EH
DIIRUGHG WKH GHFLVLRQ FDQQRW EH FKDOOHQJHG PHUHO\ EHFDXVH WKH VKHULII
FRQVLGHUV LW WR EH ³ZURQJ´ $ KHDULQJ¶V GHFLVLRQ LV ³MXVWLILHG´ LW LV VXEPLWWHG
ZKHQ WKHGHFLVLRQFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGKDVD UDWLRQDOEDVLVDQG LVZLWKLQ WKH
UDQJH RI UHDVRQDEOH RXWFRPHV /RUG 1HXEHUJHU LQ 5H % $ &KLOG95 LQ
DVVHVVLQJZKHWKHUWKHMXGJHDWILUVWLQVWDQFHZDVULJKWRUZURQJLQKROGLQJWKDW





                                                          
93 M v Locality Reporter Manager 2014 Fam LR 23 at [42]. 
94 Remembering always that the sheriff may hear evidence in an appeal and so test the facts upon 
ǁŚŝĐŚĂŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝƐďĂƐĞĚ Ps.155(5). 




7KHUH DUH SHUKDSV WZR IDFWRUV WKDWPLJKW VXJJHVW WKDW VKHULIIVRXJKW QRW WR
DIIRUGVXFKGHIHUHQFHWRWKHRXWFRPHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHKHDULQJ7KHILUVWLVWKDW
WKHVKHULIIWRZKRPDQDSSHDOLVWDNHQLVHPSRZHUHGXQXVXDOO\IRUDSSHDOV96
WRKHDUHYLGHQFH LQGHWHUPLQLQJ LWVRXWFRPH 7KHVWDWXWHKRZHYHUH[SOLFLWO\
SURYLGHV WKDW WKH VKHULII LV QRWREOLJHG WRKHDU HYLGHQFH DQG LW LV OLNHO\ WR EH
DSSURSULDWHRQO\ZKHQWKHDSSHDOLVRQHRIIDFWUDWKHUWKDQRIWKHMXVWLILDELOLW\RI
WKH RXWFRPH GHWHUPLQHG RQ XQFRQWURYHUWHG IDFWV 7KHUH LV QR SURFHVV
VSHFLILHGEH\RQGWKHKHDULQJRIHYLGHQFHE\ZKLFKWKHVKHULIIFDQFRQGXFWD
VRUW RI MXGLFLDO FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJ LQ RUGHU WR UHDFK KLV RU KHU RZQ ZHOIDUH
MXGJPHQW 
 
7KH VHFRQG SRWHQWLDO DUJXPHQW DJDLQVW VWURQJ DSSHOODWH GHIHUHQFH LQ WKLV
FRQWH[W LV WKH IDFW WKDW WKH 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQW LQWURGXFLQJ WKH &KLOGUHQ¶V
+HDULQJV %LOO H[SOLFLWO\ LQWHQGHG VKHULIIV WR KDYH PRUH RYHUYLHZ RI KHDULQJV¶
GHFLVLRQV WKDQ WKH\ KDG KLWKHUWR EHHQ LQFOLQHG WR H[HUFLVH  7KH 6FRWWLVK
*RYHUQPHQW¶V3ROLF\2EMHFWLYHVSHFLILHG LQ LWV3ROLF\0HPRUDQGXPSXEOLVKHG
ZLWKWKH%LOOZDVWR³PDNHFOHDU´WKDW³WKHVKHULIIKDVDYDLODEOHWRKLPWKHSRZHU
WR FRQGXFWDZLGH UHYLHZRI WKH LVVXHV WKDWDKHDULQJFRQVLGHUHG´97 7KLV LV
FOHDUO\ZLGHUWKDQDUHYLHZRIWKHIDFWVXSRQZKLFKWKHKHDULQJ¶VGHFLVLRQZDV
EDVHG 7KH3ROLF\0HPRUDQGXP JRHVRQ WR VWDWH WKDW WKLVZDVGHVLJQHG WR
UHLQIRUFH ³WKH GHOLEHUDWH OHJLVODWLYH LQWHQWLRQ RI WKH  $FW´ ZKLFK ZDV WR
SURYLGHWKDWDSSHDOVWRWKHVKHULIIFDQEHZLGHLQVFRSH³VXFKDVWKDWLWFDQEH
HIIHFWLYHO\ D UHKHDULQJ RI WKH PDWWHU´98  7KLV PD\ ZHOO KDYH EHHQ WKH
*RYHUQPHQWDO LQWHQWLRQEHKLQGERWKWKH&KLOGUHQ6FRWODQG$FWDQGWKH
&KLOGUHQ¶V+HDULQJV6FRWODQG$FWEXWVWDWXWRU\ ODQJXDJHWRJLYHHIIHFW
WR LW LV DOPRVW HQWLUHO\ DEVHQW99 ZKLFK LV OLNHO\ WR EH WKH PDMRU UHDVRQ ZK\
                                                          
96 dŚĞŽŶůǇŽƚŚĞƌ  “ĂƉƉĞĂů ?in the 2011 Act in which the sheriff may hear evidence is a review of the 
ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚy under s.166. 
97 Policy Memorandum, para [380]. 
98 Ibid at [382]. 
99 dŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĂĨƚŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ŝůů, June 29, 2009 (ISBN 978 0 7559 
8113 7), ss.180- ? ? ? ŐĂǀĞ ƐŚĞƌŝĨĨƐ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ  “ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ
ƐŚĞƌŝĨĨƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ^ĞƐƐŝŽŶǁĞƌĞƚŽŚĞĂƌ “ĂƉƉĞĂůƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŚĞƌŝĨĨ ?ƵƚƚŚŝƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
extension of the role of the sheriff was widely resisted and by the time the Bill was presented to the 








WLPH RI WKH GHFLVLRQ DSSHDOHG DJDLQVW101  +RZHYHU WKDW SRZHU FDQ EH
H[HUFLVHG RQO\ DIWHU WKH VKHULII KDV GHWHUPLQHG ZKHWKHU WKH DSSHDO LV
VXFFHVVIXORUQRW WKDW LVZKHWKHU WKHKHDULQJ¶VGHFLVLRQZDV MXVWLILHGRUQRW
DQG VR FDQQRW LQ ORJLF GHWHUPLQH WKH TXHVWLRQ RI WKDW VXFFHVV7KH IDFWRUV
DUJXLQJLQIDYRXURIUHGXFHGDSSHOODWHGHIHUHQFHLQDSSHDOVDJDLQVWFKLOGUHQ¶V
KHDULQJV¶ RXWFRPH GHFLVLRQV DUH QRW LW LV VXEPLWWHG VXIILFLHQWO\ VWURQJ WR
RYHUZKHOP WKH RUWKRGR[ DSSURDFK GHVFULEHG DERYH DQG HQFDSVXODWHG LQ WKH




7KHUH LVDQRWKHU W\SHRIGHFLVLRQ WKDWDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ102PD\PDNHDQG
RQH WKDW GRHV QRW IDOO REYLRXVO\ ZLWKLQ DQ\ RI WKH FDWHJRULHV RI GHFLVLRQ
GLVFXVVHGHDUOLHU LQ WKLVDUWLFOH 6LQFH WKHFRPLQJ LQWR IRUFHRI WKH$FW
WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJ KDV EHHQ HPSRZHUHG WR GHWHUPLQH WKDW DQ LQGLYLGXDO
ZKRGRHVQRWIDOOZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³UHOHYDQWSHUVRQ´FRQWDLQHGLQVRI
WKH  $FW LV QHYHUWKHOHVV WR EH GHHPHG WR EH D UHOHYDQW SHUVRQ103
'HHPLQJ DQ LQGLYLGXDO WR EH D UHOHYDQW SHUVRQ LV D FUXFLDO SURWHFWLRQ RI WKDW
LQGLYLGXDO¶VSDUWLFLSDWRU\ULJKWVLQWKHKHDULQJSURFHVV7KHGHFLVLRQLVFHUWDLQO\
QRW D PDWWHU XSRQ ZKLFK WKH KHDULQJ FDQ H[HUFLVH DQ\ GLVFUHWLRQ WKH$FW LV
FOHDU WKDW LI WKH VWDWXWRU\ WHVW ± WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDO KDV RU KDV UHFHQWO\ KDG
VLJQLILFDQWLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHXSEULQJLQJRIWKHFKLOG±LVPHWWKHQWKHLQGLYLGXDO
³PXVW´ EH GHHPHG WR EH D UHOHYDQW SHUVRQ104  1RZ FOHDUO\ WKLV LQYROYHV D
PDWWHU RI VWDWXWRU\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ EXW PRUH GLUHFWO\ LW UHTXLUHV WKH KHDULQJ WR
                                                          
100 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.51(5)(c)(iii). 
101 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐHearings (Scotland) Act, s.156(1)(b) and (3). 
102 EŽƌŵĂůůǇ ?  “ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ĂƌĞ ŵĂĚĞ ďǇ ƉƌĞ-ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ƉĂŶĞůƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
hearings, but the latter term will be used here for ease of reference. 
103 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƐ ? ? ?-81. 
104 Ibid s.81(3). 
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PDNH DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH IDFWV KDV WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V LQYROYHPHQW EHHQ




QRWRWKHUZLVHKDYHVXFKULJKWV±DQGLL LW LVDGHFLVLRQWKDW LV LQGHSHQGHQWO\
DSSHDODEOH%XWWRUHJDUGDUHOHYDQWSHUVRQGHFLVLRQDVDQRXWFRPHGHFLVLRQ
VHHPV VWUXFWXUDOO\ DUWLILFLDO  ,Q WUXWK WKDW GHFLVLRQ LV D VWHS LQ WKH SURFHVV
WRZDUGVGHWHUPLQLQJ WKH ILQDORXWFRPH IRU WKHFKLOGDQG WKHGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ
SURFHVVUHTXLUHVE\WKHH[HUFLVHRIVRXQGMXGJPHQWDQDSSUDLVDORIWKHIDFWV
WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKH VWDWXWRU\ WHVW LV VDWLVILHG  ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV LW LV DQ




GLG QRW IDOO ZLWKLQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ WR EH D UHOHYDQW SHUVRQ DQG WKH FRUUHFW
DSSOLFDWLRQRI WKHGHILQLWLRQ LWVHOIZDV UHJDUGHGDVDQ LVVXHRI IDFW105 8QGHU
WKH$FWWKHGHFLVLRQUHPDLQVSHUFHLYHGE\WKH&RXUWRI6HVVLRQDVEHLQJ
RQHRIIDFW,Q7Y/RFDOLW\5HSRUWHU106WKH,QQHU+RXVHGHVFULEHGWKHGHHPHG
UHOHYDQW SHUVRQ WHVW DV ³D IDFWXDO WHVW DOEHLW D FRQFOXVLRQ ZKLFK KDG WR EH
GHULYHG IURP RWKHU DJUHHG RU HVWDEOLVKHG SULPDU\ IDFWV´  ,I WKH GHHPHG
UHOHYDQW SHUVRQ GHFLVLRQ ZHUH SXUHO\ RQH RI IDFW WKHQ WKH DSSHOODWH WULEXQDO
WKHVKHULIIRXJKWWRGHIHUWRWKHKHDULQJ¶VFRQFOXVLRQLQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWWKH






VXFK WKDW 7KRPDV Y 7KRPDV JRYHUQV WKH OHYHO RI DSSHOODWH GHIHUHQFH 7KH
                                                          
105 S v N 2002 SLT 589 at [6]; P v Locality Reporter Manager [2014] CSIH 66 at [19].  See also S v Locality 
Reporter Manager 2014 Fam LR 109 at [26] and [42]. 
106 2015 Fam. L.R. 2 at [12]. 
107 2011 Act, s.164(5). 
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GHFLVLRQ UHTXLUHG LV EHWWHU VHHQ DV DQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH IDFWV LQ RUGHU WR
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHVWDWXWRU\WHVWKDVEHHQVDWLVILHGDQGWKLVVXJJHVWVWKDW
WKHDSSHOODWHGHIHUHQFH WKDWDVKHULIIRXJKW WRVKRZVKRXOGEHVLPLODU WR WKDW
VKRZQE\WKH&RXUWRI6HVVLRQWRWKHVKHULII¶VHYDOXDWLYHGHFLVLRQVLQUHVSHFWRI
VJURXQGVRIUHIHUUDOWRWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ,QIDFWKRZHYHUWKHSULPDU\
GHWHUPLQDQWRI WKH OHYHORIDSSHOODWHGHIHUHQFH LV WKH VWDWXWRU\ ODQJXDJH WKH
JURXQGLVWKHVDPHJURXQGDVWKDWVSHFLILHGIRUGLVSRVLWLYHGHFLVLRQVWKDWWKH
FRQFOXVLRQ UHDFKHG E\ WKH KHDULQJ ZDV QRW ³MXVWLILHG´108  ,W IROORZV IURP WKLV
WKDWWKHLVVXHIRUWKHVKHULIIRQDSSHDOLVZKHWKHUWKHUHOHYDQWSHUVRQGHFLVLRQ
FDQEHVXSSRUWHGE\WKHIDFWVIRXQGHGXSRQE\WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJDQGQRW
ZKHWKHUKHRUVKHZRXOGKDYHFRPH WR WKHVDPHFRQFOXVLRQDV WKHKHDULQJ
,QGHHG LWPLJKWEHDUJXHGWKDWWKLVFRQFOXVLRQLVVWURQJHUIRUUHOHYDQWSHUVRQ
GHFLVLRQV WKDQ IRU GLVSRVLWLYH GHFLVLRQV RI WKH KHDULQJ EHFDXVH, in sharp 
contradistinction to appeals to the sheriff under s.154 (against dispositive 
decisions), the sheriff has no power to hear evidence in a relevant person 
appeal.109  7KLV ZRXOG VHHP WR PHDQ WKDW D VKHULII PXVW DFFHSW WKH IDFWXDO
EDVLVRIWKHKHDULQJ¶VGHFLVLRQWKRXJKLIWKHVHIDFWVKDYHFKDQJHGWKHDSSHDO
FRXUWLVDEOHWRWDNHWKDWLQWRDFFRXQW110$GHFLVLRQEDVHGXSRQIDFWVWKDWDUH
LQFRUUHFW RU QR ORQJHU UHOHYDQW LV XQOLNHO\ WR EH ³MXVWLILHG´  7KH RYHUDOO
FRQFOXVLRQ IRU UHOHYDQWSHUVRQDSSHDOVKRZHYHU LV WKDW WKHGLFWXPRI6KHULII
3ULQFLSDO 1LFKROVRQ DSSOLHV KHUH DV LW DSSOLHV WRGLVSRVLWLYH GHFLVLRQV ,Q 7 Y







                                                          
108 2011 Act, s.160(3) and (4). 
109 Cf. s.155(5) and s.166(4). 
110 As the Court of Session did in T v Locality Reporter 2015 Fam. L.R. 2 where the children had by the 
time of the appeal moved from the foster carers who had been deemed by a pre-hearing panel to be 
relevant persons. 







FDWHJRULHVDUHVLPSO\QRW WKDWFOHDUDQG WKHLUERXQGDULHV LQVRIDUDV WKH\GR
H[LVWDUHSURWHDQ $TXHVWLRQRI ³SXUH ODZ´RURI ³SXUHGLVFUHWLRQ´ LVD UDUH
EHDVW LQGHHG  %XW LI WKH UHDVRQLQJ RIIHUHG DERYH LV FRUUHFW WKHQ FHUWDLQ
FRQFOXVLRQVFDQEHGUDZQ 
 




WKH ³SODLQO\ZURQJ´ OHYHO LQ IDYRXURI WKH ³ZURQJ´ OHYHO WRGHWHUPLQHDSSHOODWH








RXWFRPH GHFLVLRQV WKH ³SODLQO\ ZURQJ´ WHVW IRU DSSHOODWH LQWHUIHUHQFH ± DV
LQWHUSUHWHG E\ /RUG 5HHG LQ +HQGHUVRQ Y )R[ZRUWK ,QYHVWPHQWV /WG ±
FRQWLQXHVWREHDSSOLHG LQ6FRWODQGERWK LQUHVLGHQFHDQGFRQWDFWFDVHVDQG
LQFKLOGSURWHFWLRQFDVHV7KHDWWHPSWWROLPLWWKLVDSSURDFKWR³GLVFUHWLRQDU\´
GHFLVLRQV IDLOV GXH WR WKH LPSRVVLELOLW\ RI FODVVLILFDWLRQ  ,W ZRXOG LQ DGGLWLRQ
FUHDWHSRLQWOHVVFRPSOH[LW\WRWUHDWSULYDWHODZFDVHVGLIIHUHQWO\IURPSXEOLFODZ
FDVHVEHFDXVH LQERWKDQRQ-DXWRPDWLFVHOHFWLRQ IURPD UDQJHRIDFFHSWDEOH
RSWLRQV LV WKH WDVNEHIRUH WKHGHFLVLRQ-PDNHU %HFDXVH MXGJPHQWUHTXLUHV WR
EHH[HUFLVHGDQGWKHODZKDVFRQIHUUHGWKHSRZHUWRPDNHWKDWMXGJPHQWRQ
WKHILUVWLQVWDQFHWULEXQDODQDSSHDOFRXUWRXJKWQHYHUWRRYHUWXUQDORZHUFRXUW
                                                          






7KLUGO\ FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJV GR QRW UHTXLUH D GLIIHUHQW DSSURDFK WR DSSHOODWH
GHIHUHQFHEXWWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHV\VWHPVHUYHVWRHPSKDVLVHWKHLPSRUWDQFH
RI HQVXULQJ WKDWGHFLVLRQVDUHPDGHE\ WKHERG\DSSRLQWHGE\3DUOLDPHQW WR
PDNH WKHP  $OORZLQJ WKH ILUVW LQVWDQFH GHFLVLRQ-PDNHU WKH KHDULQJ D
JHQHURXVDPELWRIUHDVRQDEOHGLVDJUHHPHQWDFKLHYHVWKLVDQGLQVRIDUDVWKDW
JHQHURXVDPELW LVHQFDSVXODWHG LQ WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH ³QRW MXVWLILHG´ WHVW
RIIHUHGE\6KHULII3ULQFLSDO1LFKROVRQLQ:Y6FKDIIHUWKDWWHVWDVDPDWWHURI
SULQFLSOHRXJKWWREHXSKHOG 
